From 5255b3fcbd7ebf322b2af0d7120f0ad94156284b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kathleen Fitzpatrick <3170201+kfitz@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2026 15:39:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] try 400 --- feed/feed.xml | 2 +- feed/masto.xml | 2 +- in-the-wake/index.html | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/feed/feed.xml b/feed/feed.xml index ec63dce76..fb728ad71 100644 --- a/feed/feed.xml +++ b/feed/feed.xml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ 2026-10-09T18:45:24Z https://kfitz.info/in-the-wake/ <p><em>Crossposted from the <a href="https://about.hcommons.org/2026/10/09/in-the-wake/">Knowledge Commons team blog</a>.</em></p> -<picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-400.webp 400w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-600.webp 600w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-2400.webp 2400w" sizes="100vw"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-400.jpeg" maxwidth="600px" alt="Photo by Kevin Ku on Unsplash" width="2400" height="1799" srcset="https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-400.jpeg 400w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-600.jpeg 600w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-2400.jpeg 2400w" sizes="100vw"></picture> +<picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-400.webp 400w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-600.webp 600w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-2400.webp 2400w" sizes="100vw"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-400.jpeg" width="2400" alt="Photo by Kevin Ku on Unsplash" height="1799" srcset="https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-400.jpeg 400w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-600.jpeg 600w, https://kfitz.info/img/GWB-J0ImyT-2400.jpeg 2400w" sizes="100vw"></picture> <p>Yesterday, we published a message to the Commons community explaining our recent downtime. In the interest of transparency, I want to dig a little further into what happened, how we responded, and what we have learned. The entire Commons team welcomes your feedback.</p> <h2 id="what-happened">What Happened?</h2> <p>On the afternoon of October 1, 2026, an attacker began scanning our WordPress installation for security vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, there were vulnerabilities to be found; we have known for some time that a few of our dependencies (various pieces of lower-level software in our stack) had security issues, and we have been working over the last year to close those holes. Those issues could not be resolved by simply bumping the software to its next version, because every new version of a small piece of software brings with it the potential for breaking something unexpected in a complex network like ours. Not only are we operating with a complex codebase, but our users are building their sites on top of our platform, and updates run the risk of breaking what <em>they</em> have done. As a result, updating our codebase requires substantial effort to ensure that the upgrades are done safely, as well as to test the results and remediate any problems. That work was almost complete, but we ran out of time.</p> diff --git a/feed/masto.xml b/feed/masto.xml index 587a938b4..8eeba3e8b 100644 --- a/feed/masto.xml +++ b/feed/masto.xml @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ pre[class*="language-diff-"] { https://kfitz.info/in-the-wake/ Crossposted from the Knowledge Commons team blog.

-Yesterday,...
+Yesterday, we...
diff --git a/in-the-wake/index.html b/in-the-wake/index.html index c8d0d3b2b..df9989d83 100644 --- a/in-the-wake/index.html +++ b/in-the-wake/index.html @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ hr.new {

Crossposted from the Knowledge Commons team blog.

-Photo by Kevin Ku on Unsplash +Photo by Kevin Ku on Unsplash

Yesterday, we published a message to the Commons community explaining our recent downtime. In the interest of transparency, I want to dig a little further into what happened, how we responded, and what we have learned. The entire Commons team welcomes your feedback.

What Happened?

On the afternoon of October 1, 2026, an attacker began scanning our WordPress installation for security vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, there were vulnerabilities to be found; we have known for some time that a few of our dependencies (various pieces of lower-level software in our stack) had security issues, and we have been working over the last year to close those holes. Those issues could not be resolved by simply bumping the software to its next version, because every new version of a small piece of software brings with it the potential for breaking something unexpected in a complex network like ours. Not only are we operating with a complex codebase, but our users are building their sites on top of our platform, and updates run the risk of breaking what they have done. As a result, updating our codebase requires substantial effort to ensure that the upgrades are done safely, as well as to test the results and remediate any problems. That work was almost complete, but we ran out of time.